Large NcN_c Universality of The Baryon Isgur--Wise Form Factor: The Group Theoretical Approach

In a previous article, it has been proved under the framework of chiral soliton model that the same Isgur--Wise form factor describes the semileptonic $\Lambda_b\to\Lambda_c$ and $\Sigma^{(*)}_b\to\Sigma^{(*)}_c$ decays in the large $N_c$ limit. It is shown here that this result is in fact independent of the chiral soliton model and is solely the consequence of the spin-flavor SU(4) symmetry which arises in the baryon sector in the large $N_c$ limit.Comment: 10 pages in REVTeX, no figure

Enforcement against Counterfeiting in the People\u27s Republic of China

Although the discussion in this Article is limited to counterfeiting in China, many of the issues discussed are endemic to the Chinese legal system as a whole, and apply also to other intellectual property rights, such as copyright piracy and patent infringements. Moreover, many of the themes raised in this Article also illuminate the current state of the nascent Chinese legal system as a whole and how its capacity is tested as it continues the struggle to keep pace with China\u27s many economic reforms and accompanying social changes. Part I of this Article begins with a review of the enforcement system against counterfeiting in China and examines the legal problems that prevent more effective enforcement in China.25 After reviewing China\u27s current issues, this Part will then analyze and suggest different ways of viewing and handling some of the same issues, based in some measure on United States law and practice.26 No attempt is made here to criticize the Chinese government for its current efforts in enforcing trademark rights against counterfeiting. Rather, this Article is intended to present China with some alternative ways of viewing and handling some of these difficult issues and to serve as a basis for exchange and dialogue between the United States and China. Part I concludes with some observations about the future of counterfeiting in China

China’s Response to the Global Financial Crisis: Implications for U.S. – China Economic Relations

The consequences of the global financial crisis for United States-China economic relations are still unfolding, and it is still unclear whether trade tensions will escalate into trade sanctions. What seems clear, however, is that there is a rising tide of protectionism in both countries based upon what hardliners on each side perceive to be unfair practices and policies implemented by the other. Historically, mutual policies of protectionism between trading partners leads to trade sanctions, which would be an unfortunate result for United States-China economic relations. It remains to be seen whether hardliners in both countries will push the two trading partners into an escalating trade war or whether more moderate voices in the two countries can help to address existing trade issues without resorting to a trade war. This article discusses the potential for an escalation in trade tensions between the two countries as a result of measures taken by China in response to the global financial crisis. This article proceeds in three parts. The first part examines the effects of the global financial crisis on China. The second part examines China’s response to the global crisis. The final part of this article examines the position of the United States that China’s policies (some of which predated the global financial crisis) and its current economic stimulus package may, in the view of the United States, contain unfair trade practices that justify the imposition of trade sanctions

China\u27s Anti-Corruption Crackdown and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act

China’s highly publicized crackdown on corruption may affect the type and number of cases in China that arise under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”), but it should not be assumed that the crackdown will necessarily lead to fewer FCPA prosecutions. Although there is some overlap of the goals of China’s corruption crackdown and the goals of the FCPA, China’s crackdown also serves important goals of the ruling Communist Party. The main goal of the current crackdown is to reinforce the Party’s power by targeting enemies and rivals of the current leadership. The crackdown is not aimed at prohibiting bribes given to foreign officials for the purpose of obtaining business; however, the FCPA is aimed at proscribing these types of bribes. As a result, while the crackdown may deter some types of FCPA cases from arising in China, other types of cases will be unaffected or may even increase

Can the United States Impose Trade Sanctions on China for Currency Manipulation?

Anti-China critics argue that the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) engages in a long-standing and intentional pattern of currency manipulation that artificially devalues the Chinese currency, the Renminbi (RMB or “people’s currency”) versus the USD. The devaluation of the RMB makes Chinese goods less expensive to the U.S. consumer as they need to exchange fewer dollars for the same amount of RMB used to purchase Chinese imported goods. At the same time, U.S. goods are more expensive to the Chinese consumer as they need to use more RMB to exchange for the same amount of USD needed to purchase U.S. goods. This devaluation of the Chinese currency results in China exporting more goods to the United States and the United States exporting fewer to China. This pattern leads to an increase in the U.S. trade deficit with China, which has already reached a massive $319.28 billion in 2015, by the far the largest U.S. trade deficit with any individual trading partner. A trade deficit of this size has many negative consequences for the United States, such as closed factories, lost jobs, and stagnant wages. China’s currency manipulation is another instance, according to the anti-China critics, of how China conducts international trade to the detriment of the United States. One of the most prominent anti-China critics, newly-elected President Donald Trump, promises to impose punitive tariffs of 45% on all Chinese imports to offset the effects of China’s currency manipulation. Should such a measure become enacted, it would cause shock waves around the world and could possibly plunge the world into a trade war between the United States and China with costly ramifications for every corner of the globe. This article examines the main arguments that China’s currency manipulation justifies the U.S. imposition of trade sanctions. A detailed legal analysis reveals that China’s currency manipulation violates no legal obligations under the World Trade Organization, hereinafter referred to as “WTO.” As a result, the United States cannot lawfully impose trade sanctions on China consistent with the WTO. If the United States imposes such sanctions, China will likely be able to successfully challenge the sanctions in the WTO and win a WTO decision requiring the United States to withdraw the sanctions. The article then argues that a different set of strategies is needed to deal with China’s sharp tactics in international trade, as exemplified in the United States’ recent strategy in creating mega-free trade agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership

Enforcement against Counterfeiting in the People\u27s Republic of China

Although the discussion in this Article is limited to counterfeiting in China, many of the issues discussed are endemic to the Chinese legal system as a whole, and apply also to other intellectual property rights, such as copyright piracy and patent infringements. Moreover, many of the themes raised in this Article also illuminate the current state of the nascent Chinese legal system as a whole and how its capacity is tested as it continues the struggle to keep pace with China\u27s many economic reforms and accompanying social changes. Part I of this Article begins with a review of the enforcement system against counterfeiting in China and examines the legal problems that prevent more effective enforcement in China.25 After reviewing China\u27s current issues, this Part will then analyze and suggest different ways of viewing and handling some of the same issues, based in some measure on United States law and practice.26 No attempt is made here to criticize the Chinese government for its current efforts in enforcing trademark rights against counterfeiting. Rather, this Article is intended to present China with some alternative ways of viewing and handling some of these difficult issues and to serve as a basis for exchange and dialogue between the United States and China. Part I concludes with some observations about the future of counterfeiting in China

The Costly Problem of Poorly Drafted Choice of Law Clauses

This piece is a response to John Coyle, The Canons of Construction for Choice-of-Law Clauses, 92 Wash. L. Rev. 631 (2017)